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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JEANNA M. DALLEY, Case No. 880360 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
Category 14b 
UTAH VALLEY REGIONAL MEDICAL 
CENTER; IHC HOSPITALS, INC., 
dba UTAH VALLEY REGIONAL 
MEDICAL CENTER; HOWARD R. 
FRANCIS, M.D.; KENT R. GAMMETT, 
M.D.; PROVO OBSTETRICS AND 
GYNECOLOGY CLINIC; and JAMES P. 
SOUTHWICK, M.D., 
Defendants-Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT SOUTHWICK 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The trial court dismissed plaintiff's complaint on the 
defendants' motions for summary judgment. The order of 
dismissal was entered on August 18, 1988 and plaintiff filed 
her notice of appeal on August 30, 1988. (R. 223-25, 228-29.) 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2-2(3)(i) (1987). 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Whether plaintiff may apply the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur to multiple defendants, including Dr. Southwick who 
was not in a position to cause or prevent the kind of injury 
the plaintiff alleges. 
2. Whether plaintiffs claims for medical malpractice 
fail as a matter of law without expert testimony establishing 
that defendant's conduct more probably than not caused 
plaintiff' s injuries. 
3. Whether a patient alleging medical negligence may 
recover for emotional distress unrelated to any personal injury. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a medical malpractice action arising out of care 
rendered to plaintiff Jeanna Dalley at Utah Valley Hospital on 
February 5, 1985. The plaintiff, in her complaint filed 
January 28, 1987, claims she was burned on her right leg while 
she was anesthetized for an elective caesarian section. 
(R. 1-3.) Each of the individual defendants moved for summary 
judgment alleging plaintiff could not prevail on her medical 
malpractice claim without either expert testimony regarding 
negligence and causation or a sufficient evidentiary foundation 
to support the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur and also on the 
basis that the claims for emotional injury were not recognized 
in Utah. (R. 69-71, 100-02, 160-62.) 
On June 14, 1988, plaintiff filed a motion in limine asking 
for judicial notice of a question of law. (R. 172-73.) 
Defendants filed reply memoranda in opposition to plaintiff's 
motion in limine and the court heard argument on both the 
motion in limine and the motions for summary judgment on 
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July 22, 1988. (R. 178-88, 301-7, 232-33.) On August 1, 1988, 
the trial court concluded the evidentiary foundation for the 
application of res ipsa loquitur was not met. In its ruling 
the court stated: 
Here, plaintiff has failed to establish sufficient 
foundation for the application of res ipsa loquitur 
and has failed to produce expert medical testimony and 
since this is not an exceptional case, res ipsa 
loquitur does not apply. Even assuming the jury would 
infer negligence by some body [sic], if they believed 
plaintiff had no burn when she arrived at the 
hospital, the failure to show wiaat instrumentality 
caused the burn and which defendant(s) controlled that 
instrumentality would still leave us without any 
specific culpable party or parties. Therefore, the 
application of res ipsa loquitur in this matter is 
inappropriate. (R. 220-21; copy attached in Appendix 
"A.M) 
Judge Ballif signed the order granting defendants* motions and 
denying plaintiffs motion in limine on August 18, 1988. (R. 
223-25.) Plaintiff filed her notice of appeal on August 30, 
1988. (R. 228-29.) 
The facts of this case with regard to defendant 
Dr. Southwick, are undisputed: (1) Dr. Southwick was the 
anesthesiologist; (2) his sole function was to administer and 
to monitor anesthesia during surgery; (3) he performed his 
responsibilities competently; (4) at no time was Dr. Southwick 
near the patient's legs; and (5) at no time was Dr. Southwick 
in •'control" of any -instrumentality* which could possibly have 
caused burns on the patient's calf- (See Affidavit of Dr. 
Southwick attached as Exhibit WB.") 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff may not rely on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur 
to create an inference of negligence absent a showing that the 
accident was of a kind which in the ordinary course of events 
would not have happened had the defendant(s) used due care, 
that the instrument or thing causing the injury was at the time 
of the accident under the management and control of the 
defendant(s), and that the accident happened irrespective of 
any participation at the time of the plaintiff. In this case, 
neither plaintiff nor defendants can identify the offending 
instrumentality and there is no evidence regarding management 
or control thereof. To apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur 
to the scant facts of this case would contradict established 
Utah case law and create strict liability without fault for the 
named physicians. In addition, even if this case justified 
application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, plaintiff 
would still be required to produce expert testimony regarding 
causation. Without such expert testimony, plaintiff has failed 
to establish the prima facie elements of a claim for medical 
malpractice and defendants are entitled to summary judgment as 
a matter of law. 
Further, plaintiff cannot recover for negligent infliction 
of emotional distress that is not related to any physical 
injury. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR CANNOT BE 
APPLIED TO THIS DEFENDANT. 
In order to rely upon res ipsa loquitur a plaintiff must 
first establish a sufficient evidentiary foundation to support 
application of the doctrine and its inference of negligence. 
The circumstances supplying that foundation have been 
enumerated by the Utah courts as follows: 
The rule . . . is applicable when: (1) the accident 
was of a kind which, in the ordinary course of events 
would not have happened had the defendant used due 
care; (2) the instrument or thing causing the injury 
was at the time of the accident under the management 
and control of the defendant; and (3) the accident 
happened irrespective of any participation of the 
plaintiff. 
Robinson v. Intermountain Health Care, 740 P.2d 262, 265 (Utah 
App. 1987) citing Moore v. James, 5 Utah 2d 91, 96, 297 P.2d 
221, 224 (1956). Clearly, in the present case, plaintiff has 
failed to establish the necessary evidentiary foundation to 
support application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. 
The case at bar is directly analogous to Talbot v. Groves 
Latter-day Saints Hospital, 21 Utah 2d 73, 440 P.2d 872 (1968), 
(copy attached as Exhibit MCM) which involved a patient who 
discovered an arm injury once he recovered consciousness after 
a back operation. The physician did not recall the particular 
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surgery and the record in the Talbot case "was silent as to 
what/ if anything, went on while the patient was in the 
recovery room and the length of time the plaintiff was there 
and who was in charge during that period-" Id., at 873. After 
it was discovered that Talbot was having some difficulty with 
his right arm, he was referred to a neurologist who testified 
the probable cause of the damage to the nerves could have been 
caused Jby a lack of blood supply to the nerves. The neurologist 
was unable to arrive at any definitive cause for the impairment 
of the blood supply in this case and none of the physicians 
involved could explain the cause of the plaintiff's disability. 
The plaintiff in the Talbot case did not claim that the 
defendants were guilty of specific acts or omissions amounting 
to negligence, but he did contend that he was entitled to the 
benefit of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur on the basis that 
his injury would not have occurred without negligence on the 
part of someone and that he was within the control of the 
defendants when he suffered the injury. The defendants claimed 
that the foundational facts were insufficient to permit 
application of the doctrine. 
The Utah Supreme Court held: 
In examining the facts of the case hefore us, we are 
of the opinion that there is insufficient foundation 
on which to base the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. 
The fact plaintiffs disability resulted from an 
uncommon or rare occurrence does not release him from 
the burden of establishing causation. An inference of 
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negligence cannot be permitted solely upon the basis 
that the plaintiff developed a rare complication while 
undergoing medical and surgical treatment. The 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has no application 
unless it can be shown from past experience that the 
occurrence causing the disability is more likely the 
result of negligence than some other cause. 
id. at 873. 
In Talbot, as in the case at bar, the plaintiff sought to 
recover against each of the defendants by showing that at one 
time or another during his treatment at the hospital one or the 
other of the defendants was in charge of him. However, the 
plaintiff did not attempt to show that the injury to his arm 
occurred while he was in the care of a particular defendant or 
defendants. Further, the testimony produced by the plaintiff 
failed to show the thing, instrument or occurrence which caused 
the plaintiff's disability. In addition, there was no testimony 
establishing which of the defendants had the responsibility for 
the instrumentality which caused plaintiff's disability. The 
Court held: 
The plaintiffs case in [the foregoing respects] fails 
to meet the standards for the application of the 
doctrine as set forth in prior decisions of this 
Court. In this case the plaintiff asked the court to 
extend the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to a 
situation where a number of people had control or 
partial control of the plaintiff during surgery and 
thereafter, and where his injury may have occurred by 
the act or omission of any one of them, and outside 
the observation of the others. It would seem to us 
that such an extension to the doctrine would be 
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unwarranted and it would be using the doctrine to 
accomplish a result without regard to its limitations. 
Id. at 874, footnotes omitted. 
It is interesting to note that appellant attempts to rely 
on the dissenting opinion in the Talbot case rather than the 
majority or the concurring opinion. Specifically, Justice 
Henriod in his concurring opinion disagreed with the dissent 
and its reliance on Ybarra v. Spangard, "which has been honored 
only for its dissonance with common law fundamentals" and 
"which has been followed only by emotion, - not reason, logic 
or the application of legal principles." 440 P.2d at 874. 
Further, Justice Henriod's concurring opinion specifically 
distinguishes Beaudoin v. Watertown Memorial Hospital, a case 
relied upon in appellant's brief, as a case in which the "focal 
point was not so much res ipsa loquitur, but stated that the 
facts indicated that laymen could decide the matter without 
expert opinion and that the defendants had complete control." 
Id. at 875. He went on to state: 
That is not the case here, where the facts did not 
reflect who had control, but guessed about that phase 
of the case by simply saying somebody had control and 
that everybody joined in the action should pay. 
Id. 
Justice Henriod warned that application of such "dichotic, 
disarming and dissonant dictum" as relied on in the dissenting 
opinion would result in "liability without fault." Id. 
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The precedent established in Talbot has never been altered 
and the decision has been cited frequently since its 
publication. See, for example/ Vanderwater v. Hatch, 835 F.2d 
1035, 1038 (10th Cir. 1987) (applying Utah law); Robinson v. 
Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 740 P.2d 262, 265, 266 (Utah 
App. 1987); Ballow v. Monroe, 699 P.2d 719, 721, 722 (Utah 
1985); Allen v. United States, 588 F.Supp. 247, 407 (D. Utah 
1984); Schmidt v. St. Joseph's Hospital, 736 P.2d 135, 138 
(N.M. App. 1987) Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348, 352, 353 
(Utah 1980). 
In sum, here, as in Talbot, plaintiff has failed to prove 
the existence of essential facts necessary to bring the rule 
into operation as to this defendant; specifically, plaintiff 
has presented no evidence of exclusive control and management 
of an instrumentality which caused the injury complained of by 
the patient. Similarly, in Barrett v. Emanuel Hospital, 669 
P.2d 835 (Or. App. 1983) a surgical patient brought an action 
against the surgeons, anesthesiologist, hospital and 
professional corporation to recover damages allegedly suffered 
as a result of knee surgery. The Court addressed the identical 
issue presented here: whether res ipsa loquitur can permit an 
inference of negligence against all defendants notwithstanding 
plaintiff's stated inability to prove that the negligence of 
any particular defendant or defendants was the probable cause 
of the patient's injuries and notwithstanding plaintiff's 
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failure to show which of the several possible instrumentalities 
caused the injury and which of the several defendants had 
exclusive control over any particular instrumentality. 
The Barrett court concluded: 
[T]he availability of the res ipsa loquitur inference 
is contingent on the plaintiff's showing that the 
injury was probably caused by some negligent conduct 
of a particular defendant or defendants. . . . The 
requirement of the defendant's connection with the 
harm is fundamental in any decision of the element of 
"control" in res ipsa loquitur . . . The second 
requirement for res ipsa loquitur is commonly stated 
in terms of defendant's exclusive control of the 
injuring agency. The logical basis for this 
requirement is simply that it must appear that the 
negligence of which the thing speaks is probably that 
of defendant and not of another. . . . 
Reduced to essentials, the rule adopted in Ybarra 
and the rule plaintiffs urge us to adopt is simply 
that anything a plaintiff cannot prove about a 
defendant's conduct in an operating room should be 
inferrable. In our view, that rule is contrary to 
what the Oregon cases have consistently and correctly 
stressed: the only inference res ipsa loquitur 
permits is the ultimate fact of negligence, and that 
inference is permitted only when the plaintiff is able 
to establish by proof, inter alia, the probability 
that a particular defendant's conduct was the cause of 
the plaintiff's harm. 
669 P.2d 839-840, cites omitted, emphasis in original. 
Based on the lack of evidence presented by plaintiff, a 
jury could only speculate as to causal negligence, as to who, 
as to what, as to how, and as to when the alleged injury may 
have occurred. Further, there is absolutely no reason to hold 
Dr. Southwick in this case as there is no evidence that the 
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requisite standard of care was not met nor any evidence that 
Dr. Southwick's conduct caused injuries to the plaintiff. He 
cannot be held liable for plaintiffs injuries simply because 
he was in the same room for a short period of time. 
Consequently, there is no evidence creating a genuine issue of 
any material facts on the elements of plaintiffs negligence 
claim and the trial court's decision to grant defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment should be affirmed. Robinson v. 
Intermountain Health Care, 740 P.2d at 264, citing Celotex 
Corp. v. Catrett, U.S. , 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L. 
Ed.2d 265 (1986). 
POINT II 
THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR DOES NOT 
OBVIATE THE NEED FOR EXPERT TESTIMONY 
REGARDING CAUSATION. 
To establish a prima facie claim for medical malpractice, 
plaintiff must prove, through competent expert testimony, the 
defendant deviated from recognized and accepted medical 
standards and that such a deviation caused plaintiff's 
injuries. Hoopiiaina v. Intermountain Health Care, 740 P.2d 
270 (Utah App. 1987). Thus, even if "exceptional circumstances" 
justify an inference of negligence, plaintiff still must 
produce competent expert testimony regarding causation. 
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As the Utah Appellate Court recently noted in Chadwick v. 
Nielsen, 94 Utah Adv. Rep. 45, 47 (1988): 
The Utah Supreme Court [in Nixdorf] held that jurors 
could determine the standard of care the doctor was 
required to follow without expert medical testimony 
because it is common knowledge that reasonable medical 
practitioners do not leave surgical instruments inside 
their patients' bodies and then keep it a secret. 
However, the Court noted the scope of the Nixdorf exception 
is often misinterpreted; plaintiff must still produce competent 
expert testimony that the negligence complained of proximately 
caused the injuries. 
Th[e] Nixdorf exception expressly obviates the need 
for expert testimony only in establishing the standard 
of care and breach of that standard by the doctor. 
The medical malpractice plaintiff must still 
ordinarily provide expert testimony, as did the 
Nixdorf plaintiff, to establish that the doctor's 
negligence proximately caused plaintiff's injury. 
94 Utah Adv. Rep. at 47 citing Nixdorf, 612 P.2d at 354 n. 17; 
Anderson v. Nixon, 139 P.2d 216, 220 (Utah 1943). 
Thus, such expert testimony is critical on the issue of 
causation, an element which must be separately established by 
the plaintiff in order to prevail in a medical malpractice case. 
Res ipsa loquitur is an evidentiary doctrine aiding in 
the proof of negligence; it has no bearing on the 
issue of causation, which must be separately and 
independently established. As in any negligence 
action, a legally-recognizable causal link must be 
established between defendant's act or omission and 
plaintiff's injury. Absent such a causal relationship, 
defendant's conduct, negligent or otherwise, gives 
rise to no liability. Res ipsa loquitur does not 
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relieve plaintiff of this obligation; rather, it 
permits him, in lieu of linking his injury to a 
specific act on defendant's part, to causally connect 
it with an agency or instrumentality, under the 
exclusive control of the defendant, functioning in a 
manner which, under the circumstances, would produce 
no injury absent negligence. However, where the 
agency or instrumentality is not established to be the 
cause of plaintiff's injury, or where it is not shown 
to be under the exclusive control of the defendant, 
the causal connection is not established, and 
inference of negligent conduct giving rise thereto is 
nullified. 
Anderton v. Montgomery, 607 P.2d 828, 834 (Utah 1980), 
footnotes omitted, emphasis added. 
Thus, even if the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur were to 
apply, plaintiff would still be required to produce competent 
expert testimony regarding causation. This, she has failed to 
do. Consequently, the second tenet of a medical malpractice 
claim has not been established and the granting of defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment should be affirmed. 
POINT III 
PLAINTIFF CANNOT RECOVER FOR NEGLIGENT 
INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS. 
Plaintiff claims to have sustained "severe emotional 
distress" for complaints unrelated to any personal injury 
resulting from care rendered by the defendants. The Utah 
Supreme Court has never recognized a cause of action for the 
negligent infliction of emotional distress under the 
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circumstances presented in this case. The case most directly 
on point, Reiser v. Lohner, 641 P.2d 93 (Utah 1982), involved 
an appeal of the trial court's ruling in favor of defendant's 
motion for summary judgment as to plaintiff's cause of action 
for emotional distress. In holding that the grant of summary 
judgment was proper, the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
It is well established in Utah that a cause of action 
for emotional distress may not be based upon mere 
negligence. In Samms, this Court held as follows: 
Our study of the authorities, and of the 
arguments advanced, convinces us, that conceding 
such a cause of action, may not be based upon 
mere negligence, the best considered view 
recognizes an action for severe emotional 
distress, though not accompanied by bodily impact 
or physical injury, where the defendant 
intentionally engaged in some conduct toward the 
plaintiff . . . ; and his actions are of such a 
nature as to be considered outrageous and 
intolerable in that they offend against the 
generally accepted standards of decency and 
morality. (Citing § 46, 1948 Supplement to the 
Restatement of Torts.) 
641 P.2d at 100; citing, Samms v. Eccles, 11 Utah 2d 289, 358 
P.2d 344 (1961); Jeppsen v. Jensen, 47 Utah 536, 155 P. 429 
(1916). 
Plaintiff attempts to rely on the recent case of Johnson v. 
Rogers, 90 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (1988) in an attempt to support her 
claim for recovery based on emotional distress. While it is 
true the Johnson court "deliberately departed" from the 
approach taken in Reiser v. Lohner and "chose to address the 
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question anew/' the facts and conclusions reached by the 
Johnson court are inapposite to the facts of this case. 90 
Utah Adv. Rep. at 8. 
In the Johnson case, plaintiffs sought compensatory damages 
for the wrongful death of their child, as well as for emotional 
distress and physical injury to the father. The facts of that 
case differ significantly from the present case in that the 
father and son were standing on a curb, waiting for the "walk" 
signal when defendant's truck crossed the intersection and 
jumped the curb hitting the boy and injuring the father. The 
Court focused on the "zone of danger" line of cases and 
concluded: 
I would hold that one may recover for the negligent 
infliction of emotional distress when one was in the 
zone of danger created by the negligence and suffered 
a physical impact. 
id. at 10. 
Thus, the Johnson decision does nothing to support 
plaintiffs attempt to recover for emotional distress absent 
any showing of outrageous, intolerable or deliberate misconduct 
on the part of any of the defendants as required by prior case 
law. 
Furthermore, at the time plaintiff filed her complaint in 
January of 1987, there was no recovery for alleged emotional 
distress recognized in the State of Utah. The Johnson Court 
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did not give its holding retroactive effect; therefore, Reiser 
would apply and bar plaintiff's claim, 
CONCLUSION 
Under Utah law, in order for the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur to apply, plaintiff must show how the injury occurred 
and who controlled the instrument causing the injury. Absent 
such a showing, plaintiff cannot rely on the doctrine of res 
ipsa loquitur to create an inference of negligence. Further, 
even if the facts were sufficient to warrant application of the 
doctrine, plaintiff would still be required to produce 
competent expert testimony that the cause of plaintiff's 
injuries were more likely than not due to the negligent conduct 
of the defendant. Without a sufficient evidentiary framework 
and alternatively without expert testimony regarding causation, 
the lower court's ruling granting defendant James P. Southwick's 
motion for summary judgment should be affirmed. 
DATED this / 0 ^ day of February, 1989. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
By ^ V ^ ^ M ^ ff^i^^w 
Elliott J. Williams 
Elizabeth King Brennan 
Attorneys for Respondent 
James P. Southwick, M.D. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY., STATE OF UTAH 
******* 
JEANNA M. DALLEY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
UTAH VALLEY REGIONAL 
HOSPITAL, et al., 
Defendants. 
Case Number:CV 87-206 
RULING 
******** 
This matter is before the court on defendants1 motions 
for summary judgment. Plaintiff opposes the motions, and all 
parties have filed memo of points and authorities in support of 
their respective positions. The court having carefully considered 
the motions and the accompanying memo, and having heard oral 
argument, now enters its: 
RULING 
Defendants' motions for summary judgment are well taken 
and are hereby granted. 
The motions are based on two grounds: First the 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not app]y here; second, there 
is no cause of action for negJigent infliction of emotional 
distress. 
To apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur requires the 
establishment of evidentiary foundation. The elements of the 
evidentiary foundation are: (1) the accident was of a kind which, 
in the ordinary course of events, would not have happened had the 
defendant(s) used due care, (2) the instrument or thing causing 
the injury was at the time of the accident under the management 
and control of the defendant(s), and (3) the accident happened 
irrespective of any participation at the time by plaintiff. 
Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P.2d 352-53 (Utah 1980). It is undisputed 
that plaintiff, nor defendant(s), cannot identify the offending 
instrumentality to say nothing of management or control thereof. 
In addition, in medical malpractice cases, plaintiff 
is required to produce expert medical testimony, except in 
exceptional cases (of which this may be one if an instrumentality 
could be found) to establish that the outcome was more likely the 
result of negligence than some other cause. Robinson v. 
Intermountain Health Care Inc., 740 P.2d 262 (Utah App. 1987). 
Here, plaintiff has failed to establish sufficient 
foundation for the application of res ipsa loquitur, and has 
failed to produce expert medical testimony, and since this is not 
an exceptional case, res ipsa loquitur does not apply. Even 
assuming the jury would infer negligence by some body, if they 
believe that plaintiff had no burn when she arrived at the 
hospital, the failure to show what instrumentality caused the 
220 
burn, and which defendant(s) controlled that instrumentality 
would still leave us without any specific culpable party or 
parties- Therefore, the application of res ipsa loquitur in this 
matter is inappropriate. 
The failure to show what caused the injury also 
precludes maintaining an action for negligent infliction of 
emotional distress. 
Based on the foregoing analysis, defendants' motions 
for summary judgment are hereby granted. 
DATED in Provo, Utah thisj_ day of August, 1988. 
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EXHIBIT B 
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ELLIOTT J. WILLIAMS (A3483) 
ELIZABETH KING BRENNAN (A4863) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant 
James P. Southwick, M.D. 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JEANNA M. DALLEY, 
Plaintiff, AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES P. 
SOUTHWICK, M.D. 
vs. 
UTAH VALLEY REGIONAL MEDICAL 
CENTER, I.H.C. HOSPITALS, INC., 
dba UTAH VALLEY REGIONAL 
MEDICAL CENTER, HOWARD R. 
FRANCIS, M.D., KENT R. 
GAMMETTE, M.D., PROVO 
OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY CLINIC, 
and JAMES P. SOUTHWICK, M.D., 
Defendants. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
James P. Southwick, M.D., being first duly sworn, deposes 
and states as follows: 
Civil No. 87-206 
Judge George E. Ball if 
1. My name is James P. Southwick, and the information 
contained in this Affidavit is true and is based on my personal 
knowledge. 
2. That I am a medical doctor with a specialty in anesthe-
siology. I am licensed to practice medicine in the State of 
Utah, with my offices located in Provo. 
3. That I was involved in the practice of medicine as an 
anesthesiologist in the State of Utah during 1985, the time in 
question in the Complaint of Jeanna M. Dalley. 
4. That I am familiar with the standards of professional 
care, learning, skill and treatment ordinarily possessed and 
used by anesthesiologists in this and similar communities in 
1985. Specifically, I am familiar with the standards of appro-
priate medical practice served and followed by anesthesiolo-
gists in the evaluation and treatment of patients presenting 
for repeat elective low transverse cervical c-section. 
5. That I have been board certified by the American Board 
of Anesthesiology. My education and training are outlined in 
my curriculum vitae attached hereto. 
6. That my opinions set forth in this Affidavit are based 
upon my review of: 
(a) The Complaint filed in this matter; 
(b) The medical records of Jeanna M. Dalley; and 
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(c) My personal contact with and recollection of this 
patient. 
7. That the medical records set forth above in paragraph 
6(b) are the type of records generally relied upon by physi-
cians in their day-to-day practice to determine the history, 
care and treatment of patients. 
8. That from my total review of the medical records and 
other information received, and based upon my experience and 
expertise as an anesthesiologist, it is my opinion that the 
medical care and treatment rendered by myself to Jeanna Dalley 
complied in all respects with the standards of professional 
care, learning, skill and treatment ordinarily possessed and 
used by anesthesiologists in good standing in this and similar 
communities in 1985. 
9. That at no time whatsoever during the course of Jeanna 
Dalley's treatment, surgery and hospitalization in February 
1985 did I have control of any instrumentality which could have 
possibly caused a burn on the patient's lower right leg. 
10. That at no time during the course of Jeanna Dalley's 
surgery was I near the patient's legs. 
11. That based upon my review of the medical records as 
previously referenced, the allegations of medical negligence 
and malpractice against me are not supported by the 
documentation. 
-3-
DATED this . ' day xsf Harch, 19B8. 
/- J 
James P. Southwick, M.D, 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to ±>efore me t h i s ^ / ^ day of March, 
1988. 
7 
NOTARY t^fBttC / / J' f // 
Residing &.\^UaM <V U f&.ju 
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CROCKETT, G J., and CALLISTER, 
TUCKETT and HENRIOD, JJ., concur. 
Of WttHttTsTSTlH^ 
21 Utah 2d 73 
Elden R. TALBOT, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
DR. W. H. GROVES' LATTER-DAY SAINTS 
HOSPITAL, INC., and the Estate of Burke 
M. Snow, M.D., By and Through Its Ad-
ministrators, Zions First National Bank, 
Melba B. Smith, Pamela B. Snow and 
Phylis K. Snow, and Grant M. Reeder, M. 
D., Defendants and Respondents. 
No. 10970. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
May 2, 1968. 
Patient, who discovered arm injury 
when he recovered consciousness in his 
hospital room after back operation, brought 
a malpractice action against hospital, doc-
tor who performed back operation, and 
doctor who administered anesthetic. The 
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, 
Leonard W. Elton, J., entered a judgment 
adverse to the patient, and the patient ap-
pealed. The Supreme Court, Tuckett, J., 
held that res ipsa loquitur may be appli-
cable in a malpractice case if there is suf-
MtTER, 2d SERIES 
ficient evidentiary foundation for appli-
cation of the doctrine, but that the doctrine 
was not applicable in the present case 
where the patient did not attempt to show 
that his arm injury occurred while he was 
in the care of a particular defendant or de-
fendants, and testimony produced by pa-
tient failed to show the thing, instrument, 
or occurrence which caused the arm injury, 
and the testimony did not show which of 
the defendants had the responsibility for 
the instrumentality which caused the arm 
injury. 
Judgment affirmed. 
Ellett, J., and Crockett, C. J., dissented. 
1. Physicians and Surgeons $=>I8(6) 
Res ipsa loquitur doctrine may be ap-
plied in a malpractice case if there is suf-
ficient evidentiary foundation for applica-
tion of the doctrine. 
2. Hospitals <§=8 
Physicians and Surgeons $»I8(6) 
Res ipsa loquitur was not applicable in 
action by patient, who discovered injury 
of his right arm when he regained con-
sciousness in hospital room after back op-
eration, against hospital, doctor who per-
formed operation, and doctor who admin-
istered anesthetic, where patient did not 
attempt to show that his arm injury oc-
curred while he was in the care of par-
ticular defendant or defendants, and tes-
timony produced by patient failed to show 
thing, instrument, or occurrence which 
caused arm injury, and testimony did not 
show which defendant had responsibility 
for instrumentality which caused disabili-
ty. 
3. Negligence ^» 121(2) 
/ Res ipsa loquitur has no application 
*omless it can be shown from past experi-
ence that occurrence causing disability is 
more likely the result of negligence than 
some other cause. 
Joseph S. Knowlton, of Wilkinson, 
inson & Knowlton, Salt Lake City, 
appellant. 
i , WiU^ 
for 
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Albert R. Bowen, John H. Snow, Jay E. 
Jensen, Salt Lake City, for respondents. 
TUCKETT, Justice: 
The plaintiff, Elden R. Talbot, filed this 
action against the defendants wherein he 
seeks to recover for an injury suffered by 
him while undergoing treatment of his 
lower back. 
Talbot, a 39-year-old carpenter, suffered 
an injury to his lower back in an indus-
trial accident in October 1963. Talbot was 
admitted to the defendant hospital for treat-
ment of his back injury, and on January 
9, 1966, Dr. Burke M. Snow operated on his 
back to repair a herniated disc with a 
spinal fusion. The anesthetic was admin-
istered by Dr. Grant M. Reeder, one of 
the defendants. Dr. Owen Smoot assisted 
Dr. Snow in the surgical procedure but he 
was not made a party to this action. 
After the operation Talbot was removed 
to the recovery room and after a period of 
time he was taken to his own room. Tal-
bot had been in his own room for a period 
of approximately 30 minutes and had suf-
ficiently recovered from the effects of the 
anesthetic to notice that his right arm felt 
numb. Before Talbot's awakening there 
was a period when he was lying on his 
right side with his arm under him, and dur-
ing one period his forearm and hand were 
hanging over the side of the bed. Prior 
to surgery Dr. Reeder administered the 
anesthetic through a needle inserted in 
Talbot's right arm. Dr. Reeder testified as 
to his usual practice in placing padding 
under various bony prominences in order to 
the probable cause of the damage to the 
nerves of the plaintiffs lower arm could 
have been caused by a lack of blood supply 
to those nerves. Dr. Myers further testi-
fied that this type of nerve injury was un-
common but that he was unable to arrive 
at any definitive cause for impairment of 
the blood supply in this case. Neither Dr. 
Myers nor Dr. Reeder, who also testified • 
as an adverse party had an explanation 
for the cause of the plaintiffs disability. 
The plaintiff does not claim that the 
defendants were guilty of specific acts or 
omissions amounting to negligence, but he 
does contend that he is entitled to the bene-
fit of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur on 
the basis that his injury would not have 
occurred without the negligence on the part 
of someone, and that he was within the 
control of the defendants when he suffered 
the injury. The defendants claim that the 
foundational facts are insufficient to per-
mit application of the doctrine. 
[1] Our examination of the decisions 
of this court would indicate that the doc-
trine of res ipsa loquitur has not been ap-
plied in a malpractice case of this nature 
in this jurisdiction. However, prior deci-
sions do not indicate that the doctrine has 
no application in this type of case, and we 
are of the opinion that if there is sufficient 
evidentiary foundation the doctrine should 
be applied. 
[2,3] In examining the facts of the 
case before us we are of the opinion that 
there is insufficient foundation on which 
to base the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. 
fThe fact that plaintiffs disability resulted 
avoid problems caused by weightbearing [ from ^ uncommon or rare occurrence 
at such points. Dr. Reeder did not recall «^joes n o t reliCve him of the burden of es-
this particular operation. The record is j tablishing causation. An inference of neg-
ligence cannot be permitted solely upon Jhe 
basis that the plaintiff developed a rare 
complication while undergoing medical and 
surgical treatment The doctrine of res 
ipsa loquitur has no application unless it 
can be shown from past experience that 
the occurrence causing the disability is 
Ijnore likely the result of negligence than 
 
silent as to what, if anything, went on 
while the plaintiff was in the recovery 
room and the length of time the plaintiff 
was there and who was in charge of him 
during that period. 
After it was discovered that Talbot was 
having difficulty with his right arm, Dr. 
Snow referred him to a neurologist, Dr. 
Garth G. Myers. Dr. Myers testified that me other cause. In the state of Cali-
440 P.2d—55V* 
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fornia where the courts have applied the 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in a number 
of mal practice cases,1 the decisions have 
laid down a requirement that the proof 
must show acts of negligence which could 
have caused the injury or disability. In 
the latest California case brought to our 
attention, Tomei v. Kenning,5 the Supreme 
Court of that State had this to say: 
Since the res ipsa loquitur instruction 
permits the jury to infer negligence from 
the happening of the accident alone, 
there must be a basis either in common 
. knowledge or expert testimony that when 
^ such an accident occurs, it is more prob-
ably than not the result of negligence. 
The plaintiff seeks to recover as against 
each of the defendants by showing that at 
one time or another during his treatment 
at the hospital Dr. Snow, Dr. Reeder and 
the personnel of the hospital were in 
charge of him. The plaintiff does not at-
tempt to show that the injury to his arm 
occurred while he was in the care of a 
particular defendant or defendants. The 
testimony produced by the plaintiff fails 
to show the thing, instrument or occur-
rence which caused the plaintiffs dis-
ability. Neither does the testimony show 
which of the defendants had the responsi-
bility for the instrumentality which caused 
plaintiffs disability. The plaintiffs case 
in this respect fails to meet the standards 
for the application of the doctrine as set 
forth in prior decisions of this court.3 In 
this case the plaintiff asks the court to ex-
tend the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to a 
situation where a number of people had 
control or partial control of the plaintiff 
during surgery and thereafter, and where 
his injury may have occurred by the act or 
omission of any one of them, and outside 
1. Ybarra •. Spaniard, 25 CaL2d 486, 154 
P.2d 6S7,162 AXJL 1258. 
2. CaL, 62 CaiRptr. 9, 431 P.2d 633. 
3. Barnhill r. Touts Electric Sign Co., 13 
Utah 2d 347, 374 P.2d 311; Wightman 
v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co^  5 Utah 2d 
373, 302 P.2d 471. 
4. Funk v. Bonham, 204 Ind. 170, 183 NJE. 
312; Wolf T. American Tract Soc, 164 
the observation of the others. It woul 
sttm to us that such an extension to th 
doctrine would be unwarranted and i 
would be using the doctrine to accomplisl 
a result without regard to its limitations.* 
Our review of the evidence indicates 
that the trial court was correct in directing 
a verdict in favor of the defendants. The 
judgment of the lower court is affirmed. 
Costs to the defendants. 
COLLISTER, J., concur. 
HENRIOD, Justice (concurring). 
I concur. In doing so I dissent from the 
dissent of Mr. Justice Eilett's thesis about 
multiple defendants in res ipsa loquitur 
cases. 
In the first place, the dissent leans al-
most entirely on Ybarra v. Spangard,1 
which has been honored only for its dis-
sonance with common law fundamentals. 
The other cases cited in the dissent either 
rely on such dissonance by citing this case, 
or have no pertinency here. That case, al-
most humorously referred to as the father 
of the "California res ipsa" rule * has been 
followed only by emotion,—not reason, 
logic or the application of legal principles. 
At best, and in all fairness it should be 
dubbed the father of a yet unborn child, 
conceived to father another unborn child,— 
liability without fault 
The dissent cites Horner v. No. Pac 
Ben. Assn. in support of its position. It 
truly is not in support of Ybarra at all, 
since it did not involve multiple defendants, 
but only one,—alleged to have had com-
plete control. The decision admitted the 
cause "could readily be proved/' and that 
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur did not 
apply. 
NX 30, 58 NJL 31, 51 UJLA. 241; 
Actiesselskabet Ingrid v. Central B. Co. 
of New Jersey, 2 Cir., 216 F. 72. 
1. 25 CaL2d 486, 162 A.L/R, 1258, 154 
P.2d 687 (1944). 
2. See Adamson, "Medical Malpractice: 
Misuse of Res Ipsa Loquitur,* 46 Minn. 
Law Review (1962). 
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The dissent then cites Meyer v. St Paul 
Mercury Indemnity Co.,3 which relied on 
Ybarra, compounding the latter's error. It 
follows with Voss v. Bridwell,4 which case 
with great largess, latitude and longitude 
had to do with the "entire, complete and 
exclusive supervision and control" of all of 
said defendants,—not the case here. The 
court said "We have not overlooked Ybar-
ra * * *. There some of the language 
used in discussing res ipsa loquitur as ap-
plicable to medical malpractice cases is in-
consistent with Kansas law and the case 
cannot be cited with full approval." In 
Beaudoin v. Watertown Menorial Hcsp.,5 
the focal point was not so much res ipsa 
loquitur, but stated that the facts indicated 
that laymen could decide the matter with-
out expert opinion, and that the defendants 
had complete control. That is not the case 
here, where the facts did not reflect who 
had control, but guessed about that phase 
of the case by simply saying somebody had 
control and that everybody joined in the 
action should pay. The other cases cited 
have similar infirmities that do not apply 
to the facts in the instant case. 
One need only to read "Res Ipsa Loqui-
tur: Tabula in Naufragio" by Seavey in 
63 Harvard Law Review 643, 1950, and 
"Medical Malpractice: Misuse of Res Ipsa 
Loquitur" by 0. C. Adamson, 46 Minnesota 
Law Review 1962, to catch the vulnera-
bility of Mr. Justice Ellett's dissent and the 
inept citations mentioned. 
Furthermore, I would like someone to 
tell me how the so-called res ipsa loquitur 
rule, which requires the defendant to come 
forward and explain his doings, can apply 
when the defendant is dead and buried,— 
as is the case here. I h2Lve apprehension in 
visualizing the omniscience of the Zions 
First National Bank's explaining how the 
sponge or something else innocently stayed 
in a patient's gullet 
Also, I would like to know how justi-
fiably you can sue only five of ten known 
participants in a surgery, thereby relieving 
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the other five, any of whom could have 
been the negligent one, and then get a 
judgment against the five multiple defend-
ants who, possibly having the means finan-
cially to respond, are summoned as "multi-
ple" defendants and all of whom get stuck 
for a money judgment, because it is out of 
their power or ability to explain. That 
was what happened in this case. The doc-
tor, who apparently had an estate of sub-
stance, was sued in his casket. Kis as-
sistant, apparently one without substance, 
was not joined as a defendant. In my 
humble opinion, if res ipsa liquitur is used 
to stagger a few it should stagger the whole 
caboodle,—not just the named joined par-
ticipants,—and certainly not corpses that 
can't explain anything, including their 
own demises. All of which is reminiscent 
of Shakespeare's aside that what good men 
do is interred with their hones, hut the evil 
they do lives on (with a paraphrase apology 
to the Bard). 
Byrne v. Boadle, sired by one Pollock, 
was nothing but a dichotic, disarming and 
dissonant dictum that has led us to what 
many would hope to be retirement at birth 
and liability without fault. Freedom from 
fear, want, worry and woodsere, here we 
come, if the dissent in this case later should 
adhere. At the time of Byrne v. Boadle,— 
I think,—common law pleading was in ef-
fect But now, any plaintiff, through 
counsel, can find all the facts under the 
discovery process and no longer is there 
any need for the doctrine of "Speak for 
yourself, John," except in an unusual case. 
I say all this knowing that there are 
cases where the doctrine may be applicable, 
—but not here. 
3. 61 So^d 901 (LaJipp.1952). 
4. 188 Kan. 643, 364 P.2d 955 (1961). 
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